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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:
PETITION FOR REHEARING

Plaintiff-Respondent,

:

VS.

!

RONALD WATSON LAFFERTY,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 20,740
Category No. 1

::

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a Petition for Rehearing of a decision filed by the
Supreme Court filed on January 11, 1988.

Originally, this case

was an appeal from convictions and judgments imposed for two
counts of First Degree Murder, capital felonies; two counts of
aggravated burglary, first degree felonies; and two counts of
Conspiracy to Commit Murder, first degree felonies in the Fourth
Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, the Honorable J.
Robert Bullock, Judge, presiding.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The opinion of the court sets forth many of the relevant
facts of the case, however, there are several additional facts
which the opinion does not set forth which appellant deems
relevant to the discussion and consideration of the issues.

The

trial court held two hearings at which the four alienists either
testified
results.

in person or submitted written reports and test
The January 28, 1985 hearing transcript contains 83

pages of testimony from the four doctors who had examined the
defendant and had observed him during his stay at the Utah State
1

Hospital

including

defendant's attorney.

testimony

from Mr. Richard

Johnson,

The testimony of the alienists goes into

extensive detail in explaining the relationship of the diagnosis
of defendant and the effect upon his competency.
The January 28, 1985 transcript also contains the testimony
of Mr. Johnson who related the difficulty he had encountered in
attempting to discuss the matter with

the defendant. (1/28/85

transcript p. 81-83.
The transcript of the April 2, 1985 hearing contains 56
pages of testimony from three of the four doctors who submitted
the report of March 19, 1985, concerning the competency of the
defendant.

In that testimony, the doctors explained in detail

the reasons they felt the defendant's mental illness combined
with his mental

defect

to prevent

understanding the criminal process.

him

from

rationally

At each of the hearings, the

doctors explained in detail how the condition of the defendant
had changed from the November evaluation and attributed that
change to the anoxic brain damage suffered during the December
suicide attempt of the defendant.

INTRODUCTION
This Petition for rehearing is filed pursuant to Rule 55,
Utah Rules of the Supreme Court.

In Brown v. Pickard, denying

reh'g 11 P. 512 (Utah 1886), the Utah Supreme Court established
the standard for granting a Petition for rehearing, stating:
To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be made. We
must be convinced that the court failed to consider
2

some material point in the case, or that it erred in
its conclusions. . . 11 P. at 512.
Later, in Cummings v. Nielson, 129 P. 619 (1913) this Court
added:
To make an application for a rehearing is a matter of
right, and we have no desire to discourage the practice
of filing petitions for rehearings in proper cases.
When this court, however, has considered and decided
all of the material questions involved in a case, a
rehearing should not be applied for, unless we have
misconstrued or overlooked some statute or decision
which may affect the result, or that we have based the
decision on some wrong principle of law, or have either
misapplied or overlooked something which materially
affects the result . . . If there are some reasons,
however, such as we have indicated above, or other good
reasons, a petition for rehearing should be promptly
filed and, if it is meritorious, its form will in no
case be scrutinized by this court.
Cummings v.
Nielson, supra at 624.
The argument section of this brief will establish that, applying
these standards, this petition for rehearing is properly before
the Court and should be granted.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING DEFENDANT
COMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL
The appellant urges the court to consider the evidence of
his competency in light of the standard set forth in Dusky v.
U.S., 362 US 402 (1960).

This court found in its opinion, that

there was a lack of explanation by the experts who testified that
the defendant was not competent to stand trial as to how the
"labels" of diagnosis related to his competency.
stated that "It is unclear

The court also

what had changed since November,
3

other than the labels used to describe Laffertyfs condition."
Additionally, in footnote 3 to the decision, the court stated "..
neither the examiner's reports nor their testimony indicate the
suicide attempt and its consequences were the basis for their
changed opinions." Defendant submits that reference to the
transcripts of the two hearings contain substantial explanation
by each of the examiners as to the effect of the suicide attempt
and its consequences upon the condition of the defendant,
including responses to questions by the court as well as from
counsel for the state and defendant.

In each of the hearings,

each of the examiners explained how the loss of oxygen to
defendant's brain during the suicide attempt caused a loss of
both memory and I.Q.

The I.Q. loss was at least 22 points and

may have been as great as 37 points. (See addendum A page 48).
The examiners explained in detail how the defendant's memory loss
contributed to his incompetency. (See addendum A pages 1 to 58).
The statutes of this state which are involved in the
determination of competency, Utah Code Ann. 77-15-1 et. seq. and
in particular, 77-15-5 which governs the hearing, require that
the examiners place labels upon the condition of the defendant.
In 77-15-5 refers to title 64 which is the mental health section
of the code.

64-7-28(1) provides the definition of mental

illness as follows:
Mental illness means a psychiatric disorder as defined by
the current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders which substantially impairs a person's mental,
emotional, behavioral, or related functioning.
The

statute

requires

that the examiners
4

diagnose

some

identifiable mental illness or defect.

The examiners found

defendant to suffer from an organic amnestic syndrome and a
paranoid disorder. (See Addendum A page 17, 39, 42-43, and 55).
The specific mental illness or defects diagnosed by the examiners
are set forth in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders. (See Addendum B, pages 112-113, and 195-198).
The Dusky case requires the defendant have, in addition to
orientation to time and place and some recollection of events,
that he "has the present ability to consult with his lawyer with
a reasonable degree of rational under standing--and whether he
has a rational as well as a factual understanding
proceedings against him." 363 US 402-403.

of the

The trial court's

findings and this court's decision assume that the defendant had
the present ability since he could choose to exercise that
ability.

Defendant submits that as a result of his mental

illness and defect, he did not have the ability to so choose.
Defendant's ability to choose as set forth by the examiners was
limited by the mental illness and was demonstrated by his
behavior at the April 2, 1985 hearing when questioned by Mr.
Watson, the prosecutor.

The defendant continuously took the

Fifth Amendment as a basis for refusing to answer questions put
to him by the prosecutor even though the court explained he had
no basis to do so.

A comparison of the defendant's conduct in

the original competency hearing in October, 1984, his conduct at
the preliminary hearing, and at the arraignment hearing with the
conduct subsequent to his suicide attempt in December, 1984
5

clearly shows a marked difference in the defendant's level of
participation and understanding of the questions of the court and
counsel.

The nonorganic mental illnesses by definition include

situations such as the defendants, where the patient is
physically

fit and if able to choose to forgo irrational

behavior, the patient would not be mentally ill.
This court also ruled that the examiners "diagnoses were
based upon the premise that Lafferty's religious beliefs and
experiences did not accord with reality, an insupportable premise
upon which the trial judge could not rely..."(Decision page 5 ) .
Defendant submits that the examiners must of necessity determine
whether or not the experiences described by the defendant i.e.,
the commingling of his spirit with others at the State Hospital,
or his belief that the only way of determining the authenticity
of things to be through spiritual manifestations, are simply a
system of religious beliefs or whether they are evidence of a
delusional system.

The court cites the case of United States v.

Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 and the case of United States v. Lee, 455
U.S. 252, as prohibiting evaluation of religious beliefs.
Defendant submits that neither of the cited cases prevent the
psychiatric and psychological experts from considering whether
the beliefs are delusional or simply beliefs of the defendant.
As Dr. Van Austin testified in the April 2, 1985 hearing, he did
not feel that the defendant was incompetent in November, 1984f
even though he found the defendant to have a very strong system
of religious beliefs.

Of course, at that time the doctor was

6

aware of the defendant's claim to have received the revelation
containing the "hit list".

He stated that "as a result of the

anoxic brain damage, that system of very fervent religious
beliefs has deteriorated into a system of religious delusions".
(Addendum A page 49). To deny the defendant who happens to have a
mental illness which involves some religious fixation or delusion
the opportunity to have his mental condition considered because
it happens to involve religious matters denies that category of
mentally ill persons equal protection of the law.

Under the

court's reasoning, they would never be deemed to be incompetent
unless there was some additional condition or behavior which
could be then adequately considered.
In this case, defendant submits that the quality as well as
the quantity of information available to the four examiners who
gave the opinion that defendant was not competent far outweighed
the information and testimony provided by Dr. Thorne.

That gap

between the two opinions constitutes, at the very least, a
clearly erroneous decision by the trial court.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING DEFENDANT
TO DEFEND HIMSELF
This court found that after defendant

recovered

his

competence, he had failed to exercise his right to waive counsel
when questioned by the trial court.

As supported by the record,

throughout the prior proceedings the various judges who presided
at the preliminary hearing, at the arraignment proceeding, and
the trial judge himself had in detail questioned

7

defendant about

his waiver of his right to counsel and had in fact, made findings
of the "knowing and intentional" waiver of that right.

If, as

the court has found, the defendant was as competent at the time
of trial in April, 1985, as he was in the fall of 1984 during the
time when he was acting as his own counsel, then there had been a
competent waiver of that right.

Additionally, the court was

informed by his counsel, Mr. Johnson, as to the defendant's
desire in that matter.

Defendant submits that under the case of

State v. Penderville, 272 P2d 195, and the case of Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806, defendant should have been allowed to
represent himself.

The defendant urges the court to reconsider

its ruling on this point.

As set forth earlier, the reason

defendant wished to represent himself was twofold.

First, he did

not trust the system and did not wish to relinquish control of
his defense to Mr. Johnson, a person the examiners testified the
defendant felt to be part of the system persecuting

him.

(Addendum A page 11). Secondly, he believed that if he conducted
the defense, his spirit could mingle with the spirits of the
judge, prosecutor and jury and the truth would therefore be
discerned. (Addendum A, page 46).

If the defendant is not

incompetent as a result of the above beliefs, then he should be
allowed to present his case to the jury in the fashion and manner
which he believed to be in order.

By forcing counsel upon him,

the court created a situation where the defendant and counsel
were at odds as to the defense of the case and which was
demonstrated in the presence of the jury creating the situation
8

which occurred in McKaskle v. Wiggins, 104 S. Ct. 946, previously
cited to the court in which his appointed counsel was not able to
effectively present the defense and the defendant was not able to
defend himself.
POINT III
THE COURT MISAPPLIED A PRINCIPAL OF LAW IN DETERMINING THAT THE
PROSECUTORS CLOSING ARGUMENT DURING THE PENALTY PHASE WAS
HARMLESS ERROR.
At the conclusion of the penalty phase of the trial of the
defendant, the prosecutor, in closing argument, stated:
He will kill again. He will murder. He will take
another human life.
The only thing, ladies and
gentlemen, and believe me I know exactly what I am
saying to you, because I am going to shift my burden in
a moment, but, the only thing between ... him and his
next victim is you. The only thing that is going to
save the life of the next victim is you. I can't do it
anymore.
As stated by Associate Chief Justice, Daniel I. Stewart,
this argument of the prosecutor was improper because it was
"plainly wrong."

Justice Stewart further set forth the reason

that the prosecutorfs statement was wrong:
In a capital case, the only alternative to a death
sentence is a life sentence. Whether an inmate may
ever be paroled from such a sentence depends upon the
decision of the Utah Board of Pardons, and its decision
would necessarily be based in part upon the assessment
of the likelihood that an inmate will not be likely to
commit an act of violence if paroled. The prosecutor
simply put the matter to the jury as a false
alternative: either return a verdict of death or the
defendant will kill again.
The United States Supreme Court in Gardner v. Flordia, 430
U. S. 349 (1977) declared, "It is of vital importance to the
defendant and the community that any decision to impose the death
9

sentence be, and appear to be, based upon reason rather than
caprice or emotion."
607 P.2d

261

This Court in the case of State v. Brown,

(1980) stated

that the prosecutor

"scrupulous care" in a capital homicide case.

must use

In the Brown case,

this Court found that the prosecutor had committed prejudicial
error in the penalty phase of the trial of the defendant in that
case because of ignoring a court's admonition not to use hearsay
on hearsay evidence.

The complaint of hearsay on hearsay

evidence was the testimony of Wayne Watson, a deputy Utah County
attorney, who stated under oath as a witness, that a Mr. Bingham
had testified in a prior trial against the same defendant, Brown,
that "I just head shot to F

for messing with my brother."

The record of the proceedings of the trial wherein Mr. Bingham
was a witness against the defendant revealed that the actual
testimony given by Mr. Bingham

regarding

his memory of a

statement made by the defendant, Brown in the prior case, was, "I
shot them both in the head, " or "I head shot both of them," or
something to that effect.

In the Brown case, this Court found

the error of the prosecution to be prejudicial because the
hearsay on hearsay lacked probative value and was introduced
contrary to a court's admonition.

When one examines the

difference between the statements constituting the hearsay on
hearsay, there is very little difference.

Mr. Bingham's actual

testimony and Mr. Watson's recollection of it both indicate that
Mr. Brown stated that he had head shot or shot "both of them."
The only real difference is Mr. Watson's addition of the words
10

"for messing with my brother."
If this Court can determine that the error committed by the
prosecution in the Brown case was prejudicial error requiring a
remand for imposition of a life sentence, then certainly the
improper and false statement of Mr. Watson with respect to Mr.
Laffertyfs ability to kill again falls well within the reason for
the ruling of prejudicial error in State v. Brown.

Applying

those principals in State v. Brown should compel this Court to
find prejudicial error in the present case regarding the
prosecutor's false statement quoted herein above.

POINT IV
THE ALLOWANCE OF EVIDENCE OF VIOLENT CRIMES WHICH HAD NOT RESULTED
IN CONVICTIONS DURING THE PENALTY PHASE OF THE DEFENDANT'S TRIAL
CONSTITUTED UNFAIR PREJUDICE.
The Court in this case held "that the sentencing body —

be

it judge or jury -- may not rely on other violent criminal
activity as an aggravating factor supporting a death penalty
unless it is first convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the
accused did commit the other crime."

To implement the rule, the

Court went on to add two requirements to the penalty phase of
capital trials.

Then this Court held that the defendant's

commission of violent acts while he was incarcerated at the Utah
County Jail was proven beyond a reasonable doubt based upon
"undisputed eyewitness testimony."

Defendant argues that the

principal of law which the Court ignores in this type of
reasoning is that the defendant was not accorded the protection
11

which he has a right to rely upon as an accused.
person is accused of a crime, he then

That is, when a

is shrouded with a

presumption of innocence and a burden is placed upon the State to
prove each and every element of the charge against the accused
beyond a reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the trier of
fact.

He has the right to confront witnesses and to call

witnesses on his own behalf and to assert any defenses which may
be available to him under the law.

In a proceeding such as

occurred in the penalty phase of the trial of this case, the
defendant was never accused until the prosecution introduced
evidence of his violent acts at the jail during the penalty
phase.

Even at that time he was not formally accused, given the

opportunity for arraignment and preliminary hearing.

He was

denied his right of confrontation and certainly cannot be said to
have been shrouded with the presumption of innocence.

The State

was not required to put on evidence to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt each and every element of the "non-charged" crime.

For

this reason, the language in the case of State v. McCormick 272
Ind. 272, 397 N.E. 2d 276 (1979) as decided by Justice Stewart in
this Court's opinion is better reasoned and should be strictly
followed.

The Court in McCormick stated:

The procedure to be utilized in this case as provided
for by statute and case law will be, in fact, two
trials. The defendant will first be tried to a jury
for the killing of Douglass Overby.
If he is
convicted, a sentencing hearing will take place. At
this sentencing hearing, the defendant will, in
essence, be tried for the murder of Harold Lewis. This
hearing will be before the same jury which will have
just recently convicted the defendant of another,
unrelated murder.
The trial court noted that if
12

McCormick were tried in an actual criminal trial for
the murder of Harold Lewis, any evidence relating to
the Overby killing would be inadmissable in the State's
case in chief. Likewise, no evidence of the Lewis
killing may be admitted in this case in the trial of
Count I, the Overby killing. Thus, the effect of the
statutory procedure in the present case is obvious:
defendant McCormick would be fully tried on two
separate, unrelated charges before the same jury. He
would be tried on the second count to the jury which
has been undeniably prejudiced by having convicted him
of an unrelated murder. State v. McCormick, 272 Ind.
272, 397 N.E. 2d 276 (1979T
The reasoning of the McCormick case applies with equal force
to the sentencing procedure in this case.

Defendant contends

that this Court misapplied a principal of law and should have
found that the prosecution's use of uncharged, unconvicted
criminal activity was unfairly prejudicial and when coupled with
the prosecutor's misstatement discussed in the next previous
point, unduly prejudiced the jury and likely resulted in their
verdict of death rather than life.

POINT V
THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF PREJUDICIAL PHOTOGRAPHS AND THE USE OF
VIDEO TAPE AT THE PENALTY PHASE OF THE TRIAL UNDULY PREJUDICED
THE JURY.
This Court concluded that during the guilt phase of the
trial of Ron Lafferty the "trial court abused its discretion in
admitting the photograph into evidence."

The Court set forth the

reasons for the holding among which were that the pictures were
"quite gruesome;" that they were not

"merely crime-scene

photographs, that pictures of bodies, conveying

little

information beyond the fact that the victims died violent and
13

bloody deaths;fr that the body of the child had been "repositioned
in the crib so that the gaping neck wound and blood-covered face
and body could be seen;" that the "emotional impact of these
photographs was strong, and they had no unusual probative value."
The Court then concluded that even though the admission of the
photographs was erroneous, their use in the trial was harmless
because the "other evidence against Lafferty was so overwhelming
that there is little or no likelihood that the outcome of either
the guilt or the penalty phase of the trial was affected by the
admission of the photographs.
In capital cases, it is of vital importance to the defendant
that any decision to impose the death sentence be based on reason
rather than caprice or emotion.

This Court has emphasized that

the prosecutor must use scrupulous care in a capital homicide
case.

If the State were permitted during the penalty phase to

use as evidence

in aggravation, material

that would

be

insufficiently probative to support a conviction in the guilt
phase, then there is a chance that this material might be used by
the sentencing body as the basis for imposing death.

Gardner v.

Flordia, 430 U.S. 349 (1977); State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261
(1980); State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (1981).

It is defendant's

contention that taken alone, each one of the complained of errors
committed by the prosecution, i.e. inflammatory photographs,
false statements of the prosecutor, or evidence of crimes without
conviction, might not persuade the jury to impose the death
sentence.

However, when all three of these unduly prejudiced
14

acts of the prosecutor are combined in the death penalty phase of
the trial proceedings, the cumulative effect of them must
certainly have a much greater impact upon the minds of the jury
when coupled with the permissable evidence produced in the guilt
phase of the trial such that the jury rendered a verdict of death
rather than a verdict of life.

To allow the cumulative affect of

these three unduly prejudicial acts of the prosecution to stand
during the penalty phase of the trial ignores the principals of
law announced in the Gardner, Brown and Wood cases as set forth
herein above.

Defendant contends that absent the unduly

prejudicial acts or erroneous evidence which were allowed in the
penalty phase of the trial, the jury would not have reached the
verdict of death.

CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, Appellant respectfully petitions
this Court to reconsider its decision in this case and remand the
matter for proceedings to determine the present competency of the
defendant or, in the alternative order a new trial wherein
defendant is allowed to represent himself.

Further, that the

Court remand the matter to the District Court for a new penalty
hearing.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

15

\fi^

day of February, 1988.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies
of the foregoing Petition for Rehearing to the office of David L.
Wilkinson, Utah Attorney General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84114, postage prepaid this jfi Q^4
day of February,
1988.
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ADDENDUM A

•f'r'i.W.-

!.'X

I ! r'M j: '

O R I G I N A L

s^-

1
2

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

3

IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

4
5

THE STATE OF UTAH,

Criminal No. 9303

Plaintiff,

6
7

vs.

8

RONALD WATSON LAFFERTY,

9

Defendant.

10
11

ABSTRACTS FROM TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING: comprising the Testimony
of the Witnesses:
DR. ROBERT J. HOWELL;
DR. VAN AUSTIN;
DR. C. JESS GROESBECK; and
DR. D. EUGENE THORNE.

BE IT REMEMBERED, that the above-entitled

12

matter came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable

13

J. Robert Bullock, Judge of the above-entitled court, on

14

the 2nd day of April, 1985, commencing at the hour of 1:05

15

o'clock p.m., at Room 310, County Building, Provo, Utah;

16

That there appeared as counsel repre-

17

senting plaintiff, State of Utah, WAYNE B. WATSON, ESQ.,

18

Deputy Utah County Attorney, MS. BEVERLY RAMSEY, Deputy Utah

19

County Attorney, and NOALL T. WOOTTON, ESQ., Utah County

20

Attorney; and as counsel representing defendant, RICHARD B.

21

JOHNSON, ESQ.

22

BLED

WHEREFORE, the following proc(

23

had, as abstracted from the reporter's notes and cDmpi

24

the testimony of the witnesses, DR. ROBERT J. HOWELL; % R 7 VKW

25

AUSTIN; DR. C. JESS GROESBECK; and DR. D. EUGENE M ^ r ^ C c u n v'.

K<

1

Q

Fine.

But at least with regard to this paranoia

2

he believes that he's a subject of a persecution or, I

3

interchange the word, "prosecution"?

4

A

Yes.

5

Q

And he knows where he is today, doesn't he?

6

knows he's in Judge Bullock's courtroom?

7

A

I believe that.

8

Q

And he knows that I'm the prosecutor, representing

9

the State of Utah?

And, I'm not sure you should, but you did.
He

10

A

I haven't asked him, but I would assume so.

11

Q

And he understands that there's a jury trial system

12

in this country and a jury would be imposed in this particular

13

instance, does he not?

14

A

I'm not sure of that point.

15

Q

Ke knows who Mr. Johnson is?

16

A

Very well.

17

Q

And he knows that Mr. Johnson has been provided,

18

does he not, as far as you know, to help him if he so desires?

19

A

20

and Mr. Johnson are in league with each other.

I believe he knows that.

I'm not positive.

He also believes that you

21 I Q

In the same camp?

22

A

That's right.

23

Q

Would you be surprised if he told me just a half-

24

hour or so ago that he perhaps didn't believe that?

25

A

Yes, I wouldn't be surprised at all.

He's putten

1

me in the\ same camp, and taken me out and put me b ack :in,

2

and that wouldn 1t surprise me in the least.

3

Q

4

lem but he has been unwilling to honestly discuss this with

5

you.

6

A

7

all.

8

very few things that he remembers.

9

insist that he does remember those things.

Now, your letter talks about a memory recall prob-

Is that not true?
To me he has said that he has not fibbed to me at
And to me he has been very consistent, that there are
To other peopl e he will
He has recog-

10

nition once he hears these things.

11

recall these from within.

12

Q

13

in any respect?

14

A

At least amnesia.

15

Q

With regard to the events of July 24, 1984, do you

16

believe that?

17

A

I think that it is very fuzzy for him, yes.

18

Q

Now, if someone reconstructed that memory for him

19

and provided him all the circumstances, dates, places, times

20

and who was present during the commission of these crimes,

21

and so forth, he could have that memory reconstructed for him.

22

Couldn't he?

23

A

24

possibility.

25

Q

Ke has less ability to

Do you believe he has the condition of amnesia,

I'm not sure I would agree with that.

There's a

I'm not sure how long it would last.

All right.

If he told me on January 28th, the last

1

Manual of -- let see -- in the current Manual of Mental Dis-

2

orders, which substantially impairs a person's emotional --

3

mental, emotional behavior or related functioning.n

4

the legal definition.

5

mental illness I know of in the State.

6

That's

That's the only legal definition of

Now, what we were saying there is that he does

7

suffer from a mental illness; in fact, two: an organic

8

amnestic syndrome and a paranoid disorder.

9

on to list the criteria that would allow us to, hopefully,

And then we went

10

the Judge would order involuntary treatment for it.

11

Q

12

is an am --

13

A

Amnestic.

14

Q

-- amnestic condition?

15

A

That's correct.

16

at least that,

17

Q

18

paranoid delusional system?

19

A

All right.

That is my belief.
MR. WATSON:

That's all the questions I

have, your Honor.

22
23

And maybe more than that, but it's

The other one is the one we are talking about, the

20
21

So he has two mental illnesses, and one

THE COURT:

Now, do you have questions,

Mr. Johnson?

24

MR. JOHNSON:

25

THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor, I do.
You may cross examine.

1

CROSS EXAMINATION

2

BY MR. JOHNSON:

3

Q

4

so that the record is clear as to exactly what you have indi-

5

cated.

6

you talk about a return to a pervasive religious attitude.

7

Would you describe and define that for us, please?

8

A

Are you using my letter or the

9

Q

I'm using the Hospital's letter.

10

JA

Dr. Howell, I just want to ask you some questions

In the letter of March 19th, which you joined in,

Joint-letter.

Okay.

—

As he, as time has gone on,

11

and as you don't see the organic symptoms quite as much as

12

you did, he has become more religiously oriented.

13

judgment the religion has taken on a delusional nature.

In my
He

14

I talks about the comingling of.his spirt with other spirits on

15

I the ward.

He is become, has become more adamant about the

only true way of determining the authenticity of things is
17

| through spiritual manifestations.

And in general he has

18 I become turned more to a religious orientation.
19

But he doesn't

I have the skills that he had before the hanging incident.

20

Q

21

letter of March 19th form in your opinion the base of the

22

delusional system?

23
24

25

A

Now, does the religiosity that is pointed to in the

Well, I think the religiosity is the way the delu-

J sional system is being expressed
Q

Okay.

Now, does Ron have an attitude, in essence,

1

appreciate his predicament and participate, does the person

2

have to have some realistic sense of charges, of how it's

3

going to impact him?

4

A

5

Standard in my report.

6

Q

7

around him, when you consider, with his paranoia that you

8

have found and the delusional systems that you have talked

9

about, can he rationally, in your opinion, understand the

I believe that.

That's why I quoted the Dusky

Now, Whereas Ron can see and hear what's going on

10

trial, the procedures dealing with lawyers, judges and pro-

11

secutors?

12

A

I have an opinion on that.

13

Q

And, what's that opinion?

14

A

It is that he cannot.

15

Q

Now, I notice from the records of the Hospital that

16

aside from the matters which are indicated in the report, that]

17

there has been noted something that is referred to as a

18

"focal seizure."

19

A

That's correct.

20

Q

Would you tell the Court what a focal seizure is?

21

A

Yes.

22

a localized infection.

23

circumscribed or localized to one area.

24
25

Happened on March 21.

"Focal" means localized.

Focal infection is

So, a focal seizure means that it was

Do you want me to give a little history on my
concern about this?

1

people perceive him that way, too.

2

Q

3

Lafferty about some small difference with the rest of us of

4

how we perceive this case and his part in it, are we?

5

A

Not ±r\ my judgment.

6

Q

Are we talking about a very substantial significant

7

departure from this consentual --

8

A

Validation.

9

Q

-- validation that you talked about?

10

A

I think so.

11

Q

Okay.

12

this proceeding and his role in it and the consequences even

13

closely approach what most people would perceive?

14

A

15

defense of silence.

16

Q

17

the delusional system and the organic problem you've talked

18

about,

19

A

20

JQ

Now, just as a gauge: we're not talking with Mr.

Now, in your mind does the way Ron perceives

No, it does not.

Okay.

He said he was going to use a

Now, that perception, based upon paranoia and

—
Yes.
—

is not a result or -- Let me rephrase the ques-

21

tion.

22

has chosen to live his life, but you believe is a result of

23

a mental illness and organic problems.

24

A

That was, likely, involuntarily came upon him.

25

Q

Okay.

His rationality is not simply based upon the way he

Correct?

And it is not a choice of life, it is a resultt

1

Q

2

or whether he should be subjected to that concept, at least

3

he understands that's the game we are trying to play here.

4

A

That's correct.

5

Q

And, he knows who Mr. Johnson is.

6

A

He knows who Mr. Johnson is, that's correct.

7

Q

And, he knows that Kr. Johnson is a defense lawyer

8

and may be provided to help him if he wants that help.

9

A

In those specific words, that is correct.

10

Q

And, he knows, does he not, that the possible

11

punishment for the two murders charged at least is capital,

12

or death?

13

A

He knows that.

14

Q

And, he knows that the State is trying to pursue

15

conviction for all of the crimes that we have charged him

16

with, doesn't he?

17

A

18 J Q

Now, whether or not he agrees with that concept

He knows that.
Now, are you of the opinion —

well, I guess you

19

are because you signed the letter, that he suffers from a

20

paranoid delusional system?

21

A

That's correct.

22

Q

And, he thinks that the State is part of that systemj

23

that18 persecuting him, doesn't he?

24

A

The State and others, correct.

25

Q

Perhaps, even yourself and the Hospital staff

1

quences are.

But then I feel that he further needs to have

2

a rational understanding of that.

3

Q

4

things break down.

5

time, but how he interprets it because of the religious

6

delusional system and the paranoia, that's the off-track

7

thought patterns that you described in your definition of

8

rationality.

9

A

In this particular case, yes, sir.

10

Q

Okay.

11

whole report, but I need to ask you a couple of questions.

12

You are not basing your report and your opinion solely on

13

any particular aspect.for instance, you don't think that the

14

fact that his IQ dropped 22 point is alone sufficient to find

15

him incompetent to proceed?

16

A

No, I do not.

17

Q

You do not think the amnesia standing by itself is

18

sufficient to indicate that Mr. Lafferty ought not to proceed

19

to trial?

20

A

No.

21

Q

All right.

22

elements together upon which you base your opinion.

23

correct?

24

A

25

you are aware, we have been familiar with him over a period

And that, as I understand it, is where you say
He understands physically where ie is in

Correct?

Now, I don't want to have to go over the

Amnesia per se does not preclude competence.
It is a combination of all of these

More than that, Mr. Johnson.

Is that

It's the change.

As

1

of months now.

And, I certainly in November strongly felt

2

that although he had a strong system of religious beliefs

3

hich were quite different than many other peoples1 systems

4

of religious beliefs, that this did not represent a delusional]

5

system.

6

did not represent a delusional system at that point in time.

7

However, I believe that since the anoxious insult of the

8

hanging, this paranoid delusional system has developed.

9

I feel that this does interfere with his ability to meaning-

And, at this point in time I still believe that that

And,

10

fully function, either independently in a courtroom or with

11

the aid of counsel in a courtroom.

12

that he knows the consequences of what may happen in the

13

courtroom, he certainly does not at all understand the signi-

14

ficance of those consequences.

15

Q

16

he interacts with people, that comes and goes; he has dif-

17

ferent problems with memory, he might recall something that

18

happens today or he might not, if you asked him a week from

19

now.

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

Now, just so I understand it, from reading the

22

report, that is the March 19th letter to Judge Bullock, I

23

take it that because of all of the things you outlined: you

24

talk about the religious delusional system, you talk about

25

the blurred ego boundaries, you talk about the unable to

And, although I believe

And then as you indicated, his memory and the way

Correct?

Or, even tomorrow.

1

aware, equal —

or, a lot of precedents where people were

2

allowed to do that; they are allowed to defend themselves no

3

matter how badly they shouldn't do it.

4

Q

But, wouldn't you say that was not rational?

5

A

I would say that --

6

Q

In fact it was irrational?

7

A

I would say that may represent very poor judgment.

8

If the person had a good reason for making that decision,

9

and I have seen people that, you know, although I've said to

10

myself: god, this is a stupid decision they made based on

11

their religious beliefs or beliefs in constitutional law, or

12

whatever, say: well, okay, he's got a right to do that.

13

a bad decision, but he has a right to do that; if that

14

decision is, to me is a logical decision.

15

decision were to be based on the belief that by defending

16

himself his spirit will communicate with your spirit and the

17

jury's spirit and His Honors spirit and it will all be worked

18

out by God; there we fall down.

19

ling to believe is rational.

20

Q

21

going to put myself in the hands of competent, experienced

22

defense counsel and sit back and let defense counsel run the

23

show; if he wanted to?

24

A

25

consistent, logical -- or, give consistent, logical input to

All right.

It's

But, if that

That's beyond what I'm wil-

Can't that same person say: well, I'm

If that person were to do that and be able to make

1

vations.

2

Q

3

the skulp-monkey trial, here, we're talking about this

4

"rationality;" that, even today Mr. Watson talked about the

5

world being flat and the world being round; but, in science

6

today we have people who thing entirely different things

7

about quantum physics

8

scientific things.

9

A

That's correct.

10

Q

But, they have a means by which they get to their

11

end objective that is accessible.

12

their theories just like in the old days they rejected

13

theories about astronomy, astrology and everything else.

14

Correct?

15

A

That's c o r r e c t .

16

Q

But it does, the key to all of that is is that you

17

are dealing with some kind of logic and rationality, although

18

you might be on the wrong premise that other people can at

19

least see.

20

A

I believe that is correct.

21

Q

Now, with Mr. Lafferty, does he have that kind of

22

understandable consistent point to get: to the end that he

23

gets to?

24

A

I do not believe that he does.

26

Q

Do you think Mr. Lafferty is just simply a religious

Okay.

Now, one last point where it's almost like

or about blackholes or about new

Correct?

Other people might reject

Correct?

1

fanatic?

2

A

Well, I don't want to use those words.

3

Q

Well, I'm saying that his, his religious delusional

4

system you talk about is not just simply a choice of beliefs,

5

it is influenced by a mental illness; is it not?

6

A

7

a system of, a very strong system of religious beliefs which

8

have existed for a number of years, and they existed when we

9

previously evaluated him.

As I testified a few minutes ago:

I think he has

And, I went on to testify that I

10

believe at this point, probably as a result of the anoxic

11

brain damage, that system of very fervent religious beliefs

12

has deteriorated into a system of religious delusions.

13

MR. JOHNSON:

14

MR. WATSON:

15

THE COURT:

All right.

That's all.

I have no further question.
Is there any reason to sus-

16

pect that the situation will be different in a month, six

17

months, a year or something of that nature?

18

ated to this point and from the time of the attempted suicide,

19

what is there to indicate that there would be any change in

20

the future?

21

THE WITNESS:

If it's deterior-

Your Honor, his condition

22

certainly has improved from December 29th.

23

slowly; once at the State Hospital, it was improved, you know,

24

more.

25

THE COURT:

At first, very

What condition?

1

Court?

2

A

Yes, I believe that.

3

Q

And, he recognizes, does he not, that if he so

4

desires, he could confer with Mr. Johnson and they could

5

work together in an attorney-client relationship?

6

A

7

of those possibilities, yes.

8

Q

9

from a mental illness?

Yes.

I think factually and consciously he is aware

And you agree, apparently, that he has or he suffers

10

A

Yes, I do.

11

Q

And, what is that?

12

A

I believe he suffers from an organic amnestic

13

syndrome and an atypical paranoid reaction.

14

Q

15

"atypical paranoid reaction11 as a paranoid delusional system?

16

A

Yes, I do.

17

Q

And, that's evidenced by his concern or his religi-

18

ostic belief, is it not?

19

A

20

must add, it's not just because he has a strong fixed belief

21

system.

22

utilize his thinking within his belief system to confront

23

the facts that are facing him.

24

Q

25

above the law of the State of Utah, don't you?

Do you agree with the characterization of that

That's where it's primarily manifest, yes.

But I

The precise point is, the inability to rationally

Now, by that you are saying that he believes he's

1

discuss in his opinion whether or not certain witnesses are

2

telling the truth, and so forth.

3

A

4

construction and help from a counsel, if we are just talking

5

about memory and the memory deficit he has, that could be

6

accounted for.

7

right.

8

Q

9

delusional system he just may not want to do that, may throw

He would have difficulty with that, but with re-

I mean, that could be, that could go ahead,

But, you are saying because of this paranoid

10

the whole system out the window and say: I'm not subject to

11

the system, I'm not going to cooperate.

12

A

13

identification with his role, as he has a pervasive perception)

14

that he, for example, is not on trial, the system; and,

15

that's virtually everybody who's involved in it, including

16

the hospital, including the court process, the court indivi-

17

duals involved and everyone that's taking place.

18

Q

19

sure I understand you correctly.

20

that he is mentally defective, i.e.: he has a substantial

21

reduction in IQ such as would cause him to be unable to

22

assist counsel.

^

A

Right.

Part of his delusional system is a messianic

Now, I didn't ask you this before, but let me make

Yes.

You are not of the opinion

Right?
No, it wouldn't be because of that, no.

24

MR. WATSON:

25

MR. JOHNSON:

Thank you.

That's all

Nothing further.
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Diagnostic Categories
copy three-dimensional figures, assemble blocks, or arrange sticks
in specific designs)
(4) personality change, i.e., alteration or accentuation of premorbid
traits

D. State of consciousness not clouded (i.e., does not meet the criteria for
Delirium or Intoxication, although these may be superimposed).
E. Either (1) or (2):
(1) evidence from the history, physical examination, or laboratory
tests, of a specific organic factor that is judged to be etiologically
related to the disturbance
(2) in the absence of such evidence, an organic factor necessary for
the development of the syndrome can be presumed if conditions
other than Organic Mental Disorders have been reasonably excluded
and if the behavioral change represents cognitive impairment in a
variety of areas

Amnestic Syndrome
The essential feature is impairment in short- and long-term memory occurring in
a normal state of consciousness (i.e., not clouded). The disturbance is attributed
to a specific organic factor. Amnestic Syndrome is not diagnosed if memory impairment exists in the context of clouded consciousness (Delirium) or in association with a more general loss of intellectual abilities (Dementia).
The individual with an Amnestic Syndrome has both an ongoing inability
to learn new material (short-term memory deficit; anterograde amnesia) and an
inability to recall material that was known in the past (long-term memory deficit;
retrograde amnesia). The former is conventionally assessed by requiring the individual to remember several unrelated words or a short paragraph after a brief
(usually 5-15-minute) interval of distraction. The latter is tested by asking questions about events of the past such as birthplace, family, schooling, vocation,
major historical events, the names of recent presidents, etc. The individual with
an Amnestic Syndrome has difficulty with both of these operations of memory.
Events of the very remote past, however, are often better recalled than more
recent events. For example, an individual may remember in vivid detail a hospital stay that took place a decade before examination, but may have no idea that
he or she is currently in the hospital. So-called "immediate memory" (e.g., digit
span), however, is not impaired in Amnestic Syndrome.
Associated features. A significant degree of amnesia nearly always results in
disorientation. Confabulation, the recitation of imaginary events to fill in gaps
in memory, is often observed, and when present tends to disappear with time.
Most individuals with this syndrome lack insight into their memory deficit, and
may explicitly deny it, despite evidence to the contrary. Others acknowledge a
problem, but appear unconcerned. Apathy, lack of initiative, and emotional
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blandness are common. Although the individual is superficially friendly and
agreeable, his or her affect is shallow.
When Amnestic Syndrome is the result of Alcohol Dependence and vitamin
deficiency (see Alcohol Amnestic Disorder, p. 136), other neurological complications of alcohol ingestion and malnutrition, such as peripheral neuropathy, cerebellar ataxia, etc., may also be observed.
Course. The mode of onset depends on the etiology. In most cases it is fairly
sudden. The subsequent course, also a function of the etiology, is usually one of
chronicity.
Impairment. Impairment in social and occupational functioning is usually
moderate to severe.
Complications. Any complications are the direct result of the individual's
memory impairment. For example, the individual's forgetting to extinguish a
lighted cigarette may cause a fire.
Etiological factors. Amnestic Syndrome may result from any pathological
process that causes bilateral damage to certain diencephalic and medial temporal
structures (e.g., mammillary bodies, fornix, hippocampal complex). Examples include head trauma, surgical intervention, hypoxia, infarction in the territory of
the posterior cerebral arteries, and herpes simplex encephalitis. The most common form of Amnestic Syndrome is that associated with thiamine deficiency and
chronic use of alcohol.
Prevalence. The syndrome is apparently uncommon.
Differential diagnosis. Delirium and Dementia also involve memory impairment. In Delirium, however, there is also a clouding of consciousness; and in
Dementia, there are other major intellectual deficits as well.
In Factitious Disorder with Psychological Symptoms, memory testing often
yields inconsistent results. Furthermore, there is no organic etiologic factor.
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Paranoid Disorders

The essential features are persistent persecutory delusions or delusional jealousy, not due to any other mental disorder, such as a Schizophrenic, Schizophreniform, Affective, or Organic Mental Disorder. The Paranoid Disorders
include Paranoia, Shared Paranoid Disorder, and Acute Paranoid Disorder.
The boundaries of this group of disorders and their differentiation from
such other disorders as severe Paranoid Personality Disorder and Schizophrenia,
Paranoid Type, are unclear.
The persecutory delusions may be simple or elaborate and usually involve a
single theme or series of connected themes, such as being conspired against,
cheated, spied upon, followed, poisoned or drugged, maliciously maligned,
harassed, or obstructed in the pursuit of long-term goals. Small slights may be
exaggerated and become the focus of a delusional system.
There may be only delusional jealousy ("conjugal paranoia"), in which
an individual may become convinced without due cause, that his or her mate is
unfaithful. Small bits of "evidence/' such as disarrayed clothing or spots on
the sheets, may be collected and used to justify the delusion.
Associated features. Common associated features include resentment and
anger, which may lead to violence. Grandiosity and ideas or delusions of
reference are common. Often there is social isolation, seclusiveness, or eccentricities of behavior. Suspiciousness, either generalized or focused on certain
individuals, is common. Letter writing, complaining about various injustices,
and instigation of legal action are frequent. These individuals rarely seek treatment, and often are brought for care by associates, relatives, or governmental
agencies as a result of the individuals' angry or litigious activities.
Age at onset. Generally middle or late adult life.
Course. The course of Paranoia and Shared Paranoid Disorder is chronic
with few, if any, exacerbations or periods of remission. The course of Acute
Paranoid Disorder, by definition, is limited to six months' duration.
Impairment* Impairment in daily functioning is rare. Intellectual and occupational functioning are usually preserved, even when the disorder is chronic.
Social and marital functioning, on the other hand, are often severely impaired.
Complications. None.
Predisposing factors. Immigration, emigration, deafness, and other severe
195
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Diagnostic

Categories

stresses may predispose to the development of a Paranoid Disorder. Individuals
with Paranoid or Schizoid Personality Disorders may also have a greater likelihood of developing a Paranoid Disorder.
Prevalence. Paranoid Disorders are thought to be rare. However, Paranoia
involving delusional jealousy may be more common.
Sex ratio and familial pattern. No information.
Differential diagnosis. In Organic Delusional Syndromes, particularly those
induced by amphetamines, persecutory delusions are common.
In Schizophrenia, Paranoid Type, or Schizophreniform Disorder, there are
certain symptoms, such as incoherence, marked loosening of associations, prominent hallucinations, and bizarre delusions (e.g., delusions of control, thought
broadcasting, withdrawal, or insertion), that are not present in Paranoid Disorders. Although delusions that others are attempting to control the individual's
behavior are common in both Paranoid and Schizophrenic Disorders, the experience of being controlled by alien forces suggests Schizophrenia or Schizophreniform Disorder. In addition, delusions in Schizophrenia are more likely
to be fragmented and multiple rather than systematized, as in Paranoid Disorders.
In Paranoid Personality Disorder there may be paranoid ideation or pathological jealousy, but there are no delusions. Whenever an individual with a
Paranoid Disorder has a preexisting Personality Disorder, including Paranoid
Personality Disorder, the Personality Disorder should be listed on Axis II,
followed! by the phrase "Premorbid" in parentheses.
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297.10 Paranoia
The essential feature is the insidious development of a Paranoid Disorder with
a permanent and unshakable delusional system accompanied by preservation of
clear and orderly thinking. Frequently the individual considers himself or herself
endowed with unique and superior abilities. Chronic forms of "conjugal paranoia" and Involutional Paranoid State should be classified here.
pltfnortk criteria Ipr ttranola

A Meets the criteria for Paranoid tHsonter (p. 196).
a A chronic and stable petwcutory delusional syitem ot W J*ut # x
months'duration,

t

C Does not meet the criteria lor Shared Paranoid Okotrkn
297.30 Shared Paranoid Disorder
The essential feature is a persecutory delusional system that develops as a
result of a close relationship with another person who already has a disorder
with persecutory delusions. The delusions are at least partly shared. Usually, if
the relationship with the other person is interrupted, the delusional beliefs will
diminish or disappear. In the past this disorder has been termed Folie a deux,
although in rare cases, more than two persons may be involved.

298.30 Acute Paranoid Disorder
The essential feature is a Paranoid Disorder of less than six months' duration.
It is most commonly seen in individuals who have experienced drastic changes
in their environment, such as immigrants, refugees, prisoners of war, inductees
into military services, or people leaving home for the first time. The onset is
usually relatively sudden and the condition rarely becomes chronic.

